Posted on

Why insurance for ‘black-swan’ events isn’t paying off in this bear market

Why insurance for 'black-swan' events isn't paying off in this bear market

The bear market on Wall Street is not a “black swan.” This is important is for semantic clarity, if nothing else. The term “black swan” has been thrown around with such abandon in recent months that it’s in danger of losing all meaning.

There’s a more important reason not call this bear market a black swan: it creates unrealistic expectations about what can be achieved with black-swan protection strategies. Those strategies hedge against certain rare events, but not everything bad that can happen in the stock market.

The black swan theory has a long history in philosophy and mathematics, but its use in the investment arena traces to the work of Nassim Nicholas Taleb, a professor of risk engineering at New York University. Taleb wrote a book in 2007 entitled “Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable,” in which he defines a black swan as an extremely rare and sudden event that has very severe consequences.

A key aspect of black-swan events, Taleb argued, is that they are unpredictable. This unpredictability means that, in order to protect yourself, you must always hedge your portfolio against the worst. That hedge will detract from your return in most years, but pay off in a big way in the event of a black swan.

A good analogy is to fire insurance on your house. House fires are extremely rare, but you still buy insurance against the possibility and are more than willing to pay your insurance premium.

Black-swan insurance in the investment arena pursues two general approaches. The first is to be as conservative as possible with almost all of your portfolio and extremely aggressive with the small remainder. The second is to couple your normal equity portfolio with an aggressive hedge — such as with deep out-of-the-money puts.

Neither of these strategies has offered complete protection against the current bear market, as you can see in the chart below. The three strategies listed in the chart are:

  • Swan Hedged Equity U.S. Large Cap ETF
    HEGD,
    -0.18%
    ,
    which invests more than 90% of its portfolio in large-cap stocks and hedges with put options.

  • Amplify BlackSwan Growth &Treasury Core ETF
    SWAN,
    -0.44%
    ,
    which invests 90% in U.S. Treasurys and 10% in S&P long-dated call options.

  • S&P 500
    SPX,
    -0.34%

    fund (96.67%) plus long-dated out-of-the money puts (3.33%). This specific strategy was derived by Michael Edesess, an adjunct professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, in an attempt to replicate the reported returns of a hedge fund (whose strategy is proprietary) with which Taleb is associated.

Clearly, all three approaches’ year-to-date losses are in the double-digits, with the Amplify BlackSwan ETF actually losing more than the S&P 500 itself.

These otherwise disappointing returns are not necessarily a criticism. If this year’s bear market is not a black swan event, then it doesn’t seem fair to criticize these offerings for failing to protect investors. For example, during the waterfall decline that accompanied the economic lockdowns at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is more appropriately classified as a black swan event, a portfolio that allocated 96.67% to the S&P 500 and 3.33% to deep out-of-the-money puts would have held its own or posted a small gain.

Hedging against more than black swans

Your comeback might be to suggest constructing portfolio hedges that insure against more than just black swan-like losses. But the cost of such hedges would be much greater than the insurance premium for protecting against a black swan. That cost could be so high, in fact, that you might decide it’s not worth it.

Consider fixed income annuities (FIAs), which allow you to participate in the stock market’s upside while guaranteeing that you never lose money. The “premium” you must pay for this insurance is that your participation rate — the share of the price-only gains that you earn — is often well-below 100%. Currently, for example, according to Adam Hyers of Hyers and Associates, a retirement-planning firm, an FIA benchmarked to the S&P 500 has a 30% participation rate — in effect setting its insurance premium to be 70% of the index’s gains in those years in which the stock market rises. 

Would you be willing to forfeit 70% of the S&P 500’s price-only gains in years the stock market rises, along with all dividend income, in order to avoid losses in those years in which the market falls? There’s no right or wrong answer. But you need to be aware of the magnitude of the insurance premium.

The chart above plots the calendar-year price-only returns of the S&P 500 since 1928. The red line shows what your return would have been since then — 3.7% annualized — if you were flat in years in which the index fell, and earned 30% of the index’s increase when it rose. That 3.7% annualized return is a lot less than the 10.0% annualized total return the stock market has produced over the past nine-plus decades.

I’m not suggesting that FIAs are never appropriate in certain circumstances. In an interview, Hyers told me that there are many different FIAs to choose, and some that are benchmarked to indexes other than the S&P 500 have higher participation rates than 30%. Indeed, he added in an email, “many of the [FIAs benchmarked to] proprietary indexes have… participation rates above 100%, so those are where larger gains are locked in.”

My point in discussing FIAs is instead to remind you that there is no free lunch. The more you want to insure against losses, the more upside potential you forfeit in the process. While it is possible to insure against a black swan event, such insurance won’t protect you from all losses.

Mark Hulbert is a regular contributor to MarketWatch. His Hulbert Ratings tracks invest/ment newsletters that pay a flat fee to be audited. He can be reached at mark@hulbertratings.com

More: Don’t fear the bear. It gives you chances to pick winning stocks and beat the market.

Also read:  ‘The stock market is not going to zero’: How this individual investor with 70 years of experience is trading the bear market

Posted on

Daphne Bramham: Is paying the high price for mega-events worth it?

Share via email

As Vancouver waits to find out how many 2026 World Cup matches it will host, a new study puts the cost of mega-events into perspective.

Article content

There is no doubt that hosting some of the men’s World Cup soccer games in 2026 will provide Vancouver with a spectacle unlike most others we get to experience.

Advertisement 2

Article content

Soccer fans — especially at matches at this level — are a show unto themselves. They will be wearing outrageous costumes, singing songs, waving flags — hopefully without the hooliganism that has attended some other international matches, and without a similar ticketing debacle that recently resulted in fans being pepper-sprayed by Paris police.

Next Thursday, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association will announce whether Vancouver will get three or five of the 60 matches, and which teams will be playing.

But as people breathlessly await the announcement, a study published recently by three University of Lausanne researchers puts into perspective not only B.C.’s $250-million share of the spectacle, but Vancouver’s potential bid for the 2030 Winter Olympics.

Advertisement 3

Article content

Canadian players celebrate after qualifying for the World Cup 2022 in Qatar after beating Jamaica 4-0 in March.
Canadian players celebrate after qualifying for the World Cup 2022 in Qatar after beating Jamaica 4-0 in March. Photo by CARLOS OSORIO /REUTERS

Lead author Martin Mueller and his colleagues looked at the costs and revenues from 14 Summer Olympic Games, 15 Winter Olympics and 14 World Cups held between 1964 and 2018.

With combined costs of more than $120 billion US and combined revenue from broadcast rights, tickets and sponsorships of nearly $70 billion US, the average return on investments was a loss of 38 per cent.

“Are the Olympics and the football World Cup profitable for the IOC and FIFA (who own the rights to these events)? Yes, very much so,” they write.

“Are they profitable for the organizing committees that need to put them on? Sometimes, but not very often. For the host city and government? Hardly ever.”

Here’s how it works:

For World Cup events, all of the revenue goes to FIFA, with the organizing committee bearing most of the operational costs. For the Olympics, revenue goes to both the IOC and the organizing committee (although not necessarily equally), with the costs paid by the organizing committee and the host government.

Advertisement 4

Article content

In economic terms, these events have a structural deficit. That means they are not financial viable without external subsidies. And it means that the problem is systemic, rather than the result of poor decision-making by the hosts.

But the study’s structural deficit figures likely fall far short of the real losses because security expenses and other “indirect costs” were not included in the calculation, even though the study notes that indirect costs typically range from $1 million to $1 billion.

The study defines indirect costs as Olympic villages, media centres, and other “event-induced costs” such as new public transportation, highways, improved power supplies, and so on.

But indirect costs for the Vancouver’s 2010 Winter Games were far higher: the $2.1-billion Canada Line to the airport, the $883-million Convention Centre built for use as the media centre, and the $883-million expedited improvements to Sea-to-Sky Highway.

Advertisement 5

Article content

Based on their findings, the authors urge citizens and politicians to think differently about the “opportunity” being offered to host mega-events.

“They are not offering the rights to a profit-making business deal, but asking for subsidies for a loss-making venture.”

Citing other studies, the Swiss authors note that mega-event proponents often fall prey to “optimism bias”. Others engage in “strategic misrepresentation”.

That misrepresentation is possible because of “a principal-agent situation and information asymmetry, in which the agent (for example the city bidding for a mega-event) knows more about the real costs of a mega-event than the principal (the taxpayers), but communicates a lower cost estimate to make hosting the event more palatable to the public.”

Advertisement 6

Article content

Canadian alpine skier Brodie Seger during training prior to the start of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. REUTERS/Wolfgang Rattay
Canadian alpine skier Brodie Seger during training prior to the start of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. REUTERS/Wolfgang Rattay Photo by WOLFGANG RATTAY /REUTERS

Studies such as these, along with more media attention paid to the skyrocketing costs of recent mega-events and a growing number of venues that are never used after the events, have caused taxpayers to be less enthusiastic about being hosts, even if politicians aren’t.

In the past eight years, votes in plebiscites and referenda have quashed Olympic bids in Calgary (2018), Rome (2017), Hamburg (2015), and Oslo (2014).

And it is why the IOC has recently been urging frugality by potential host cities. It has also flattened its lengthy and expensive bidding process, with the (perhaps) unintended consequence that the new system is both shorter and less transparent.

As for the 2026 World Cup, Premier John Horgan withdrew Vancouver’s name in 2018 citing FIFA’s demand that the province “write a blank cheque.”

Advertisement 7

Article content

Chicago, Minneapolis and Glendale, Calif. also dropped out that year because of cost concerns and what were described as FIFA’s “heavy-handed demands” that included visa-free entry to FIFA representatives and exemptions from taxes and labour laws.

But three months ago, Vancouver was back in, with Horgan telling reporters that FIFA was no longer “looking for the sea and the sky in their ask from host cities.”

However, turfing the fake grass at B.C. Place — literally putting real stuff over top of the fake — was one of FIFA’s non-negotiable demands, even though the Crown-owned B.C. Pavilion Corp. spent $3.1 million completing the installation of artificial grass earlier this year.

So, good luck snagging a World Cup ticket. But even if you don’t, enjoy the party because you’re going to be paying for it.

dbramham@postmedia.com

Twitter: @bramham_daphne

Advertisement 1

Comments

Postmedia is committed to maintaining a lively but civil forum for discussion and encourage all readers to share their views on our articles. Comments may take up to an hour for moderation before appearing on the site. We ask you to keep your comments relevant and respectful. We have enabled email notifications—you will now receive an email if you receive a reply to your comment, there is an update to a comment thread you follow or if a user you follow comments. Visit our Community Guidelines for more information and details on how to adjust your email settings.